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Abstract
In this paper we investigate the potential for persuasion arising from the quan-
tum indeterminacy of a decision-maker’s beliefs, a feature that has been proposed
as a formal expression of well-known cognitive limitations. We focus on a situation
where an agent called Sender only has few opportunities to influence the decision-
maker called Receiver. We do not address the full persuasion problem but restrict
attention to a simpler one that we call targeting, i.e. inducing a specific belief state.
The analysis is developed within the frame of a n−dimensional Hilbert space model.
We find that when the prior is known, Sender can induce a targeted belief with a
probability of at least 1/n when using two sequential measurements. This figure
climbs to 1/2 when both the target and the belief are known pure states. A main
insight from the analysis is that a well-designed strategy of distraction can be used
as a first step to confuse Receiver. We thus find that distraction rather than the
provision of relevant arguments is an effective means to achieve persuasion. We
provide an example from political decision-making.
1 Introduction
In this paper we build further on a theoretical result [7] that establishes the power of
unconstrained belief manipulation or persuasion in the context of non-classical (quan-
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tum) uncertainty. That result was a first step in the development of Quantum persuasion
theory in the spirit of ‘Bayesian Persuasion’ by Kamenica and Gentskow [11], hereafter
KG. Bayesian persuasion should not be confused with the theory of persuasion in com-
munication games where an informed party (Sender) with certifiable information chooses
what pieces of information to reveal to an uninformed decision-maker (Receiver). The
subject matter of Bayesian persuasion is the choice by Sender of an ‘information struc-
ture’ (or measurement). In particular in KG, Sender is not better informed so they are
not concerned with strategic revelation (or concealment) of information. The only choice
variable of Sender is the measurement itself which is performed so the resulting signal is
revealed publicly. And the question is how much can be achieved in terms of modifying
a rational Receiver’s belief by an appropriate choice of measurement. The ultimate goal
is to influence Receiver’s decision to act which depends on her beliefs about the world.
KG investigate the issue in the classical uncertainty framework. Receiver’s beliefs are
expressed as a probability distribution over the set of states of the world and updating
follows Bayes rule. However as amply documented the functioning of the mind is more
complex and often people do not follow Bayes rule. Cognitive sciences propose various
alternatives to Bayesianism. One avenue of research within cognitive sciences appeals to
the formalism of quantum mechanics. A reason is that QM has properties that reminds
of the paradoxical phenomena exhibited in human cognition. But the motivation for
turning to QM is deeper. Indeed, the two fields share fundamental common features
namely that the object of investigation and the process of investigation cannot always be
separated. This similarity was already put forward by the fathers of quantum mechanics.
Its mathematical formalism was developed to respond to that epistemological challenge
(see [4]). In addition, quantum cognition has been successful in explaining a wide variety
of behavioral phenomena (for a survey see Bruza and Busemeyer [5]). Finally, there exists
by now a fully developed decision theory relying on the principle of quantum cognition
(see [6, 8]). Therefore in the following we shall use the Hilbert space model of QM to
represent the beliefs of an individual and capture the impact of new information on those
beliefs. Clearly, the mind is likely to be even more complex than a quantum system but
our view is that the quantum cognitive approach already delivers interesting new insights
in particular with respect to persuasion.
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In quantum cognition, we distinguish between the ”world” and the decision-maker’s
mental representation of it which is the basis for her decision. This representation of the
world is modeled as a quantum-like system and characterized by a cognitive state. The
decision relevant uncertainty is of non-classical (quantum) nature. As argued in Dubois
et al. ([9]) this modeling approach allows capturing widespread cognitive limitations
that people exhibit when constructing a mental representation of a ‘complex’ alternative.
The key quantum property that we use is that some characteristics (or properties) of a
complex mental object may be ‘Bohr complementary’ that is incompatible in the decision-
maker’s mind: they cannot have definite value simultaneously. A central implication is
that measurements (new information) modifies the cognitive state in a non-Bayesian well-
defined manner.
The kind of situations that we have in mind can be illustrated by the following story.
A member of parliament (MP) is considering voting for a law to introduce a state of
emergency in order to fight against terrorism. The terror threat can be either severe or
moderate. If the threat is perceived as severe enough by our MP, she will support the law
but not otherwise. Initially, she believes that the threat is severe with a high probability,
so she would support the law. But a civil liberty activist wants her to vote down the
law. Instead of trying to bring forward arguments about the actual threat, he brings up
another topic: the EU process of decision-making and its intrusive regulatory policies. In
particular, he proposes to find out whether the EU is regulating the weight of cucumbers
- our MP represents farm owners. EU spent many months reflecting on cucumbers and
ended up with a strict regulation which is broadly perceived as nonsensical. After this
intermezzo, they return to the emergency issue and our MP does not feel as convinced
as before and chooses to vote down the law. In section 3 we show how this story can be
formalized and explained in terms of quantum persuasion.
Our results in [7] shows that with an unbounded sequence of measurements, the belief
state of a quantum-like Receiver can be brought into any desirable state starting from
any initial unknown state. Interestingly, the idea of turning to a sequence of measure-
ments never arises in the classical context because any sequence of measurements can
be merged into a single one (possibly very hard to implement in practice though). In
the non-classical context it is generally not possible to merge several measurements into
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one direct (projective) measurement unless they are compatible. But that framework
allows accounting for incompatible measurements performed in a sequence. This incom-
patibility is an expression of the fact that measurements modify the system. How new
information modifies the cognitive state is established in [8].1 In order to extract results
of more practical significance, we here investigate the polar case when only a limited se-
quence of measurement is feasible; more precisely we shall focus on the case of one or two
measurements.
Because of the highly non-linear structure of the problem, we investigate a simpler
task that we call “targeting”. The object of targeting is the transition of a belief state into
another specified target state. We further rconfine attention to projective measurements
and combinations of those. This is because our focus is on belief manipulation or state
transition.2
Our main result (Theorem 2) shows that if the initial belief state (prior) is known, any
target state can be reached with a probability of at least 1/n (where n is the dimension of
the corresponding Hilbert space). This conclusion is also true for unknown prior when the
target is a pure state. When both the prior and the target are pure states, the probability
for successful manipulation increases to at least 1/2.
The path of measurements is of interest on its own. The second measurement fully
determines Receiver’s decision: we ask Receiver to determine herself with respect to the
decision relevant uncertainty. For instance: do you think this used smartphone is worth
more than 400 euro or less when the selling price is 400 euro. Clearly, if she thinks it is
worth less than 400 euros, it is equivalent to a decision not to buy. However in a non-
classical context, the elicitation (measurement) of the beliefs changes the state so it is not
equivalent to making the decision on the basis on the non elicited (unmeasured) belief.3
What we find most interesting is the characterization of the first measurement which aims
at creating a state of uniform uncertainty. We show in Theorem 1 that Sender can always
transform known Receiver’s prior into uniform uncertainty which explains appearance
1Updating follows Lu˝ders’ rule which generalizes Bayes’ rule to the quantum context.
2The most general type of measurements called POVM (positive operator valued measurements) do
not allow addressing state transition without additional restrictions.
3The impact of eliciting beliefs on decision-making has been exhibited in experimental set-ups see,
e.g. [10].
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of the probability 1/n. This result is in clear contrast with the classical context where
posteriors are constrained by Bayesian plausibility.4
One interpretation is that the power of quantum persuasion is related to the possibility
of creating confusion in Receiver’s mind. The strategy involves exploiting the incompati-
bility of perspectives (non-commutativity of measurements). Basically, this is a strategy
of ‘calculated diversion’ to instigate confusion. Once Receiver is confused, it is much
easier to persuade her to do what Sender wants.
The seminal paper by Kamenica and Gentskow [11] analyzes the general problem of
persuading a rational agent by controlling her information environment. It was followed
by a series of other papers addressing competition in persuasion, costly persuasion, and
most recently Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders. It also gave rise to a number of
applications, see for instance “Persuading Voters” by Alonso Camara [2]. Our contribu-
tion extends that literature with a theoretical development to non-classical uncertainty.
It also relates to more applied issues. Akerlof and Shiller [1] argue that manipulation
is determinant to the functioning of markets. They suggest that it goes well beyond
Bayesian updating: “Just change people’s focus and one can change the decisions they
make” (p.173). In this paper we show that quantum persuasion is powerful even for short
sequences of measurements and that it delivers a mechanism where merely changing the
focus of the mind can significantly affect decision-making.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we sketch the persuasion problem in
the classical setting and thereafter formulate the corresponding problem in the quantum
context. In Section 3 we analyze the targeting task and derive our main results. We
provide an illustration in terms of the example presented in the Introduction. We conclude
with some remarks.
2 The model
The persuasion problem has been formulated by Kamenica and Genskow (KG) [11] as
follows . There are two players called respectively Receiver and Sender. Receiver chooses
4Bayesian plausibility entails that that the expected posteriors must equal the priors.
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on action with uncertain consequences. To assess the value of the different actions Receiver
uses her beliefs about the state of the world. Receiver’s action also has consequences for
Sender. Therefore Sender may try to persuade Receiver so she chooses an action favorable
to him. For that purpose Sender’s selects some information structure (or measurement)
that generates new information (or signal) about the relevant uncertainty. Below we
shortly remind of the formulation of the problem in the classical setting (in its simplest
form). Thereafter, we describe in details the corresponding formulation in the context of
non-classical (quantum) uncertainty.
2.1 The classical setting
Classical, or Bayesian, persuasion has been well described by KG. The uncertainty is
formulated using a set Ω of states of Nature. For the sake of simplicity we assume that Ω
is a finite set. An action is a function a : Ω→ R; the number a(ω) is a utility of Receiver
from action a at the state ω. Receiver has to choose an action from some finite set of
available actions. Since she does not know the true state of the world, Receiver relies on
her belief to make her decision.
Receiver and Sender share a prior belief that is a probability distribution β on Ω reflecting
a common (objective) representation of the world i.e., a collection of probabilities β(ω) ≥
0,
∑
ω β(ω) = 1. Let ∆(Ω) denote the simplex of probability distributions on Ω. The
expected utility of an action a under a belief β is a(β) =
∑
ω a(ω)β(ω). Thus an action
can be represented as an affine function on ∆(Ω). Given a belief β Receiver chooses an
action a∗ that maximizes her expected utility a∗(β).
Action a brings Sender utility u(a). (Here we assume that Sender’s utility only depends
on the action chosen by Receiver and not on the state of the Nature). Sender tries to
influence receiver’s choice by providing some additional information. In order to obtain
that information, Sender performs some measurement (of Nature) and informs Receiver
about the result of the measurement.
An information structure is a map f : Ω→ ∆(S), where S denotes the set of signals.
In state ω ∈ Ω the device generates a (randomized) signal f(ω) ∈ ∆(S). If we write this
more carefully an information structure is given by a family (fs, s ∈ S) of non-negative
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function fs : Ω→ R+; fs(ω) gives the probability of obtaining signal s in a state ω ∈ Ω.
Of course,
∑
s fs must yield the unit function 1Ω on Ω.
When Receiver obtains a signal s, she, as a rational decision maker, updates her initial
belief (or prior) β using Bayes’ rule, i.e. she forms the posterior βs ∈ ∆(Ω), given as
βs(ω) = fs (ω) β (ω) /ps, where ps =
∑
ω β (ω) fs (ω) is the probability of signal s. As a
consequence, she chooses a new action a∗(βs) and Sender receives utility u (a
∗ (βs)). When
Sender uses such an information structure, his expected utility is equal to
∑
psu (a
∗ (βs)) .
KG provide a characterization of the optimal measurement i.e., of the information struc-
ture that maximizes Sender’s expected utility. Bayesian plausibility, a property that says
that the expected posterior is equal to the prior, β =
∑
s psβs plays a key role in their
characterization.
2.2 The quantum setting
The description of a quantum system starts with the fixation of a Hilbert space (in our
case finite dimensional) over the field of complex or real numbers. The choice of field
does not affect our results so for the sake of simplicity we choose to limit ourselves to
real numbers (the complex case obtains with minor changes). In this case H is simply an
Euclidian space equipped with a symmetric scalar product (.,.).
We shall be interested not so much in the Hilbert space H as in operators (that is
linear maps from H to H). For such an operator A we denote by A∗ its conjugate which
is defined by the following condition: (v, Aw) = (A∗v, w) for all u, w in H . Self-conjugate
operators (for which A = A∗) are called Hermitian5.
We model actions as Hermetian operators. The utility of an action for Receiver depends
on her belief about the state of the relevant quantum system, see [8]. We elaborate on
this below, after introducing two additional notions.
An Hermitian operator A is non-negative if (x,Ax) ≥ 0 for any x ∈ H . For example,
any projector (that is a Hermitian operator P with the property PP = P ) is non-negative.
Indeed, (x, Px) = (x, PPx) = (Px, Px) ≥ 0. More generally, for any operator C the
5More correctly we should speak here about symmetric operators; we use the term Hermitian holding
in mind the extension to the complex case.
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operator C∗C is non-negative.
The notion of trace of operators is a central instrument in what follows. It associates
to an operator A the number Tr(A) called its trace. We collect in Proposition 1 below
the properties of the trace that we use throughout the paper.
Proposition 1. i) Tr(A) is linear over A;
ii) Tr(AB) = Tr(BA);
iii) If an operator is represented by a square matrix A = (aij), then Tr(A) = a11+ ...+
ann, that is Tr(A) equals to the sum of the diagonal terms of the matrix.
iv) If A is a non-negative operator then Tr(A) ≥ 0, and equal to 0 only for A = 0.
Definition. A (cognitive) state is a non-negative (Hermitian) operator S withTr(S) =
1.
The set of states is denoted as St. It is the quantum analog to the classical set ∆(Ω).
Indeed the notion of cognitive state reminds of the notion of belief in the classical context.
The non-negativity of operator S is analogous to the non-negativity of a probability
measure, and the trace 1 to the sum of probabilities which equals 1. In a way similar
to the classical case, if the cognitive state of our DM is (operator) B she evaluates the
(expected) utility of action A as Tr(BA).
Examples of states.
1. S0 = E/ dim(H), where E denotes the identity operator on H . This is the state of
‘uniform uncertainty’ or the ‘completely mixed’ state. In a sense, this state is a central
point of the set St. The utility of an action A in this state is equal to Tr(A)/ dim(H).
2. Pure states. Let e be an element of H with length 1 (that is (e, e) = 1). And let
Pre be the orthogonal projector on e, that is Pre(x) = (x, e)e for any x ∈ H . Tr(Pre) =
(e, e) = 1, therefore Pre is a state. Such states are called pure. The utility of an action A
in such a state is equal to (e, Ae).
3. Let S be a state, and U a unitary operator (that is U−1 = U∗), then the operator
USU−1 is a state as well. Indeed, it is non-negative, and Tr(USU−1) = Tr(U−1US) =
Tr(S) = 1. Note that the state S0 is invariant under any unitary conjugation.
4. The set of states St is a convex space. If S1, ..., Sr are states, and p1, ..., pr are
non-negative real numbers such that p1 + ... + pr = 1, then the convex combination
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p1S1 + ... + prSr is a state as well. The extreme points of this convex space are exactly
the pure states. Any states can be represented as a convex combination of pure states;
therefore non-pure states are also called mixed states.
As in the classical setting, the utility of an action A is an affine function (B 7→ Tr(BA))
on the convex state space St.
We understand cognitive states as Receiver’s beliefs about the state of some relevant
quantum system.6 Receiver chooses an action from some (finite) set of available actions
to maximize her utility. Her optimal action in state B is denoted as Aopt(B). As in
the classical case, Sender may want to change receiver’s beliefs with the help of some
information structure in order to induce a choice of action that is better for him (than
the one Receiver would choose based on her prior). Below we define more precisely what
we mean by information and its impact on Receiver’s belief. Essentially, this is the main
and only difference between the quantum and the classical problem of persuasion.
Information and its impact. Information is generated by an information structure (IS)
which consists of a measurement device (MD) and an informational channel (IC). The
MD measures the system of interest and produces an outcome whereas the IC transforms
the outcomes of the measurement device into signals. Receiver is informed about the
performance of the MD, observes the signal and updates her prior belief. Formally, an IS is
defined by three things: the set S of signals, the collection of probabilities ps for the signals
s ∈ S (which depends on the state B) and the collection of associated posteriors Bs that is
the updated priors. In the present paper which focuses on updating, we have to distinguish
between the two parts of the process (MD and IC). This is because the MD acts at the
‘quantum’ level (connected with state transition) whereas the IC is a purely ‘classical’
operation. Most clearly this is illustrated by the fact that a measurement whose different
outcomes are collected into one and the same signal (which we call ‘blind’ measurement
see below) nevertheless induces a change in Receiver’s belief. The measurement device
(MD) is the core of any IS, and we have to describe it in more detail.
We next define a MD for the case the outcomes are directly communicated to Receiver
that is when the signals are equal to the outcomes. Thereafter, we introduce information
6In our context, the relevant system is the represented world, see [9].
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channels. The simplest MD consists of a single projective (or direct) measurement.
Definition. A direct (or projective) measurement is given by an orthogonal decom-
position of the unit (ODU) H = ⊕i∈IHi of Hilbert space H (or equivalently, by a family
P = (Pi, i ∈ I) of projectors, such that
∑
i Pi = E). The set of outcome of this mea-
surement is the set I; the probability pi of outcome i in state B is given by Born rule as
pi = Tr(BPi) = Tr(PiBPi). Upon obtaining a signal (outcome) i the prior B transits
into the updated state Bi given by Lu¨ders rule Bi = PiBPi/pi.
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Note that pi ≥ 0 due to Proposition 1. Moreover,
∑
i pi = 1; this is a simple con-
sequence of the equality
∑
i Pi = E. Lu¨ders rule expresses the quantum nature of our
setting. In the classical world, a measurement that generates new information changes
beliefs but not the state itself. In the quantum world, measurements can essentially
change the state of the measured system and, of course, the belief about the state. As a
consequence the expected state Bex =
∑
i piBi =
∑
i PiBPi is generally not equal to the
prior B. This is in contradistinction with the classical case where Bex = B, a property
called Bayesian plausibility. Note also that projective measurements are endowed with the
property of repeatability : if we obtain an outcome i then a repeated measurement (with
the same MD) gives the same outcome i. When all the projectors Pi are one-dimensional
(or pure states), we have a complete measurement; in this case Bi = Pi independently of
B.
Schematically, a direct measurement M can be represented as a tree where the
branches correspond to the possible outcomes. Which outcome obtains as the result
of performing the measurement depends of course on the state of the system. An impor-
tant feature of the quantum situation is that this relation is probabilistic: the state of the
system only defines the probabilities for the different outcomes. We represent MD M as
follows
7A behavioral justification for this rule is provided in [8]. And in [3] Lu¨ders rule is shown to be a
direct generalization of Bayes rule.
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✖✕
✗✔
✲
✘✘
✘✘
✘✘
✘✿
❳❳❳❳❳❳❳③
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍❥
✟
✟
✟
✟
✟
✟
✟✯
M✲B
pi(B) Bi✲
where B is the initial state of quantum system, pi(B) the probability of outcome i, and
the Bi are the resulting (updated) states.
Above we addressed single measurements. However, Sender can also use a compound
measurement consisting of a sequences of measurement devices (of course, the order in
which the measurements are performed is important). Moreover, devices applied consec-
utively can be conditional, that is they can depend on the outcome of the previous one.
The diagram below illustrates that point
✍✌
✎☞
✲
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍❥
✟
✟
✟
✟
✟✯
M
✒✑
✓✏
M1 ✲
a
b
c
✘✘
✘✘
✘✘✿
❳❳❳❳❳❳③
✒✑
✓✏
M3✘
✘✘
✘✘
✘✿
❳❳❳❳❳❳③
d
e
2
Here measurement M1 is applied when the outcome 1 of measurement M occurs, after
outcome 2 the measurement stops, and after outcome 3, measurement M3 is applied.
The set of outcomes of this compound MD is {a, b, c, 2, d, e}. The probability pa is equal
p1(B)pa(B1) whereas pd = p3(B)pd(B3). Upon receiving signal a Receiver updates her
beliefs to Ba =
Pa(P1BP1)Pa
pa
.
Let us give a formal definition of a two-stage compound measurement. Suppose that
the first measurement is given by an ODU (Pi, i ∈ I), and that for every i there is
a ‘second’ measurement Mi given by an ODU (Qj, j ∈ Ji). This compound MD has
the set of outcomes ∪i∈I({i} × Ji). The probability of outcome (i, j) (where j ∈ Ji) is
p(i, j) = Tr(Qj(PiBPi)Qj) = pj(Bi). After obtaining outcome (i, j) the system transits
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into state Bi,j = QjPiBPiQj/p(i, j).
In a similar way one can build more complicate trees of MDs. In our quantum context,
we need to consider compound MDs because the composition of two (or more) non-
commuting measurements is not a projective measurement.8
We now introduce the possibility that the outcomes of the measurement are not di-
rectly communicated. After the performance of a measurement (possibly compound),
information about the outcome is transmitted to Receiver through an information chan-
nel which transforms the outcomes of the MD into signals.
Definition. A (random) informational channel (IC) is a mapping f : I → ∆(S),
where S is the set of signals. In the other words, IC is a family (fs, s ∈ S) of non-
negative functions on the set I such that
∑
s fs = 1I . The number fs(i) is the probability
for signal s when outcome i was obtained.
Definition. An information structure (IS) is a MD (with a set I of outcomes) together
with an IC f : I → ∆(S).
Of course, using an informational channel only ”garbles” the information extracted by
the measurement device but this can be in Sender’s interest. Indeed, whenever the prior
B is a pure state, the posteriors Bi following a projective measurement (or a sequence
of direct measurements) are pure states too. But Sender may prefer Receiver to hold a
mixed posterior. A random information channel can be used for the purpose of creating
mixed posteriors.
Let us return to information structures. The probability ps for signal s is equal to
ps =
∑
i fs(i)pi. In this case the initial state (prior) B transits into the posterior Bs given
by the formula
Bs = (
∑
i
fs(i)piBi)/ps. (1)
Upon receiving signal s, Receiver understands (using Bayes rule) that the conditional
probability p(i|s) of outcome i is fs(i)pi/ps. She also understands that if she knew for
sure that outcome i occurred her belief would be represented by Bi. We can call Bi
8Compound measurements belong to a general category of quantum measurements called POVM.
However, nothing can be said in general about where such measurements takes the state. In order to
address the issue of state transition and updating one needs to consider the details of the procedure.
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‘intermediary beliefs’. Therefore the new cognitive state Bs is a mixture of the states Bi
with weights p(i|s), that is Bs =
∑
i p(i|s)Bi = (
∑
i fs(i)piBi)/ps.
If the informational channel f is the identity mapping from I to I, we speak of a
straightforward information structure. If the informational channel is degenerated (that
is S is a singleton); in other words, when Receiver gets no information except that the mea-
surement was performed, we speak of a blind measurement. After a blind measurement,
the posterior B′ is equal to
∑
i piBi. As earlier emphasized the posterior B
′ generally
differs from the prior B.
The persuasion problem. Let us return to the persuasion problem, that is to the task of
changing Receiver’s belief. Sender chooses an IS and announces it to Receiver. Thereafter
the measurement is performed, the information channel is applied and the obtained signal
is truthfully reported to Receiver. Receiver observes the signal, updates her beliefs, and
then takes an (optimal given the new belief) action. Suppose that Sender chooses an IS
with a measurement device M with the set of outcomes I and the IC f : I → ∆(S).
Suppose further that the prior beliefs of Receiver are represented by a state B, and she
observes a signal s. In this case she updates her prior B to the posterior Bs. She chooses
a new optimal action Aopt(Bs). As a consequence of using this IS, Sender expects to get
utility
∑
s psu(A
opt(Bs)).
9
Since Sender’s objective is to maximize his expected utility, the question of selecting
the optimal IS arises. In the quantum context, this problem is rather difficult due to
the high degree of non-linearity. The problem can be all the more complicated as Sender
can choose to use not a single MD, but a sequence of MDs. In the classical context
we know that this possibility has no value because any sequence of measurements can
be merged into a single one. This is generally not the case in the quantum context
where opting for a sequence of measurements can significantly increase Sender’s persuasion
power. We already mentioned an important result obtained in [7]. Namely, if Sender is
not constrained with respect to the number of measurements, then starting from any prior
he can with near certainty have Receiver’s belief transit into any targeted belief state.
Of course this result has mostly a theoretical value. It shows that, in contrast with the
9Here we assume that Sender’s belief is equal to Receiver’s one.
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classical case, there exists in principle no obstacle to persuasion.10 In practice however
the value of this result is strongly limited because Receiver is not likely to accept a large
number of attempts to be persuaded. Moreover performing measurements is likely to be
time and resource consuming. Therefore, is it interesting to investigate what Sender can
achieve with very few measurements.
Below we consider a problem closely related to persuasion that we call the targeting.
3 Targeting
As mentioned above we do not address the question of optimal persuasion. We confine
ourselves to a simpler task. Given a prior state B and a ‘target’ state T , we evaluate the
probability for the transition from B into T with one measurement or with a small series
of sequential measurements. As usual we consider the case when Sender knows Receiver’s
prior except in Proposition 3 where the result is established for unknown prior. The
solution to this task can give a better understanding on how to solve the full persuasion
problem. The connection between the two problems is most direct when Receiver chooses
between two actions only i.e., ‘Good’ and ‘Bad’ (from the point of view of Sender). We
can denote by Dg the subset (in St) of ‘good’ states (leading Receiver to choose Sender’s
preferred action) and by Db the subset of ‘bad’ ones. We can also assume that the
prior B lies in the domain Db, because in the opposite case no measurement is needed.
Then Sender chooses some point T in the ‘good’ domain Dg and looks for measurements
which gives him this target T with the largest possible probability p. This number and
associated expected utility is a lower bound for what can be achieved in the full persuasion
problem11. We leave open the important question as to how to select the point T in the
‘good’ domain Dg. Intuitively, T should be as close as possible to the prior B.
The transition from prior B to a target T is realized with the help of an IS. More
precisely suppose that we have an information structure consisting of an MD M with
outcomes in I and an information channel f : I → ∆(S). We say that a signal t ∈ S
10In classical case Bayesian plausibility constitutes a major obstacle.
11One can say that with ‘targeting’ the DM only cares about the target while ignoring all other
consequences.
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is “targeting” if t induces the transition of Receiver’s initial cognitive state B into the
target T that is if the posterior Bt is equal to T . The probability pt for the signal t is
called the probability of transition.
In other words, a signal t ∈ S is targeting if the operator ∑i ft(i)piBi (see (1)) is
proportional to the target state T , pT =
∑
i ft (i) piBi; in this case p = pt =
∑
i ft(i)pi is
the probability of transition. When Receiver learns signal t she updates her belief B into
T ; the signal t comes with probability pt. Below we use a simplified notation w(i) = ft(i)
and call w(i) the targeting weights; of course, 0 ≤ w(i) ≤ 1, pT = ∑i w(i)piBi, and
p =
∑
i w(i)pi.
Thus, we shall be dealing with the following problem. Given an initial state (a prior)
B and a final state (target) T , we search for an IS (including one MD or a sequence of
MDs) which transforms B into T with the largest possible probability. We know from
([7]) that with a large enough sequence of measurements, starting from any prior, the
probability for that transition can be made arbitrary close to 1. In the next section we
show that this probability can be made larger than 1/n with two measurements only. To
this end we below consider in detail two cases: when only one measurement is feasible
and when a series of two measurements is possible.
3.1 Transition with one measurement
It is intuitively clear that if the states B and T are close to each other then the probability
p for the transition B 7→ T can be made close to 1. Conversely, in [8] we proved that if p is
close to 1 then the states B and T are close as well. On the other hand, the probability p
can vanish. For example, if B and T are pure and mutually orthogonal states, one expects
the probability for transition to be equal to 0. Indeed, the straightforward measurement
(T, ...) gives the posterior TBT which is proportional to T , but the probability for the
transition B  T is Tr(TB) = 0. Sender could use more subtle MD to achieve his target
but the following general statement is true.
Proposition 2. Suppose that prior B and target T are orthogonal states (that is
Tr(BT ) = 0). Then no information structure with a single measurement can transform
B in T .
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Proof. Let (Pi, i ∈ I) be a direct measurement, and (w(i), i ∈ I) the corresponding tar-
geting weights. We have pT =
∑
i w(i)PiBPi. Multiplying this equation by B, we obtain
pBT =
∑
iw(i)BPiBPi. Applying the trace, we get equality 0 =
∑
i w(i)Tr(BPiBPi) =∑
i w(i)Tr(PiBPiPiBPi). Denoting Ai = PiBPi we have 0 =
∑
i w(i)Tr(A
2
i ). Each term
of this sum is non-negative (see Proposition 1), from where it follows that Tr(A2i ) = 0 if
w(i) > 0. Proposition 1 implies now thatAi = 0 for such i. Hence p =
∑
i
w(i)Tr(PiBPi) =
0. 
On the contrary, if B and T are reciprocally non-orthogonal states, then one can
transform B into T with an IS that relies on a single MD. We shall not prove this here.
Instead of, we consider three particular cases.
1A. Suppose that the target T is a pure state and is the projector on unit vector t.
Let e1, ..., en be an orthonormal basis of H such that t = e1. Let M be the complete
direct measurement on this base. If we make this measurement and obtain the outcome
1 then the prior B transits into pure state T with probability p = Tr(BT ) > 0.
Thus we have shown that if states B and T are non-orthogonal and T is pure then we
can transform B into T with positive probability p. Of course, p can be very small if B
and T are almost orthogonal. On the contrary, if B and T are close then p is close to 1.
1B. Let us consider the case when the prior B is the ‘uniformly uncertain state’
S0 = E/n, where n = dimH . We assert that one can transform S0 into any target state
T with probability at least 1/n, and explicitly indicate the corresponding MD.
Suppose that (in some orthonormal basis e1, ..., en) operator T has a diagonal form
diag(a1, ..., an). In the other words, T is the mixture a1P1+ ...+anPn, where Pi are projec-
tors on ei, ai ≥ 0, and a1+ ...+ an = 1. As the MD we take the complete direct measure-
ment associated with the basis e1, ..., en; as targeting weights, we take w(i) = ai. In this
case the posterior Bt is equal to (
∑n
i=1 aiTr(S0Pi)Pi)/pt, where pt =
∑n
i=1 aiTr(S0Pi).
But PiS0 = Pi(E/n) = Pi/n, so that Tr(S0Pi) = 1/n and pt =
∑n
i=1 ai/n = 1/n. There-
fore, the posterior is equal to
∑
i aiPi = T , and the probability of transition is 1/n.
Note that we may be able to do better. If max(ai) < 1 then we can take w(i) =
ai/max(ai) and obtain the desired transition with probability 1/n ·max(ai).
1C. Note that in point 1B above the operators B and T are compatible (commuting).
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Therefore this situation is essentially classical. The situation is completely different when
the target T is equal to S0. We show (in contrast with the classical case) that there
exists a blind measurement which transforms any arbitrary prior B (known to Sender)
into T = S0 with probability 1. Of course, that measurement is incompatible with B. The
following Lemma provides the foundation for this assertion.
Lemma. Let p1, ..., pn be non-negative numbers, the sum of which is equal to 1. Then
there exists a symmetric n × n matrix A = (aij) with spectrum p1, ..., pn and diagonal
terms 1/n (that is aii = 1/n for all i).
The Lemma above is a particular case of Horn’s wonderful theorem (see for example,
[12, Theorem 9.B.2]).
Corollary. Let B be a state. Then there exists an orthonormal basis e1, ..., en of the
space H such that (ei, Bei) = 1/n for any i = 1, ..., n.
Proof. Let p1, ..., pn be the spectrum of B; these numbers are non-negative and their
sum is equal to 1. Let A be a symmetric matrix as in Lemma. Since A has the same
spectrum asB there exists a unitary (indeed, orthogonal) matrix U such thatB = UAU−1.
Define vectors ei (i = 1, ..., n) as U(1i), where 1i is the i-th canonical basis vector in
Rn. These vectors ei form an orthonormal basis, and (ei, Bei) = (U1i, UAU
−1U1i) =
(U1i, UA1i) = (1i, A1i) = (aij) = 1/n. 
Consider now the blind complete direct measurement M, given by the basis ei from
Corollary above. The posterior is the mixture of pure states ei with weights (ei, Bei) =
1/n, that is the completely mixed state S0 = E/n. The probability of the transition (as
for any blind MD) is equal to 1.
Thus, we proved the following
Theorem 1. Any state B can be transformed with one (blind) measurement into the
completely mixed state S0 with probability 1.
This result is quite surprising because it shows that even in the case of a single mea-
surement, the quantum setting yields results clearly distinct from those obtained in the
classical case. Indeed in the classical context the support of the posterior must be in
the support of the prior distribution. What is crucial here is that we use a measurement
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which is incompatible with prior B. We shall see next that this result which in itself is
of little practical value since T seldom is equal to S0 is very useful for targeting with two
measurements. We also note that in contrast with the classical case the naive measure-
ment T (which can be understood as a direct question on beliefs) because it changes the
state has a power of persuasion as we illustrate in the example below.
3.2 The case of two measurements: instigating confusion
2A. Let us consider the following sequence of two measurements. First, we transform
the prior B into completely mixed state S0 applying the blind measurement M defined
above in point 1C. Thereafter, we apply the measurement in 1B above which transforms
S0 into the target T with a probability of at least 1/n.
This proves the following
Theorem 2. Let prior B and target T be arbitrary states. Then there exists a sequence
of two measurements transforming B into T with a probability of at least 1/n.
We do not assert that the proposed sequence is optimal rather that it defines a lower
bound. Often the transition is achievable with (much) higher probability; see Proposition
4 below.
2B. Note that in order to construct the measurement M in 1B above, we need to
know the prior B. An interesting question arises: what is achievable when the prior B is
unknown to Sender. Below we provide two particular results in this direction.
Suppose first that the target T is the completely mixed state S0. Then, we can with
probability 1, from any arbitrary unknown prior state B, transit into T with the help of
two measurements. We make an arbitrary direct measurement (with a base (e1, ..., en))
as the first measurement M0. Depending on its result i = 1, ..., n we make the second
(blind) measurement Mi, given in Theorem 1, which transforms the state Pi = Pei into
T = S0.
The second case is more subtle. Namely, suppose that our target T is a pure state,
that is the projector on a normalized vector t. Due to the Corollary of the Lemma
above (applied now to operator T ), there exists an orthonormal basis e1, ...en such that
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(ei, T ei) = 1/n for any i. Since Tei = (ei, t)t, we have 1/n = (ei, (ei, t)t) = (ei, t)
2. In the
other words, in basis e1, ...en vector t has the form (1/
√
n, ..., 1/
√
n).
Let Pi be the projector on vector ei. As the first measurementM we take the straight-
forward measurement in the basis (e1, ..., en). Applying this measurement, the prior B
transits into posteriors Bi = Pi with probabilities pi = Tr(PiB) = (ei, Bei).
What concerns the second measurement, we take it as the (naive) measurement (T, ...).
This measurement transits any posterior state Bi = Pi into the state TBiT/Tr(TBi) = T
with probability Tr(TBi) = Tr(TPi) = (t, ei)
2 = 1/n. In the average, we transit into the
state T with probability
∑
i pi · 1/n = 1/n.
Thus we proved the following
Proposition 3. If the target T is a pure state then there exists a sequence of two
measurements (depending only on T ) which transits any (known or unknown to Sender)
prior B into T with probability at least 1/n.
We conjecture that the assertion in Proposition 3 is true for any arbitrary target T ,
i.e., pure or mixed.
2C. Let us consider more in detail the two-dimensional case i.e., when the dimension
of Hilbert space H is equal to 2. Moreover, we suppose that the prior B and the target T
are pure states, given by normalized vectors b and t. Without loss of generality, we can
assume that these vectors have coordinates t = (1, 0) and b = (cos(ϕ), sin(ϕ)).
As the first measurement M we take the direct measurement with orthonormal basis
(e1, e2), where e1 = (cos(ϕ/2), sin(ϕ/2)) and e2 = (sin(ϕ/2),− cos(ϕ/2)). After this
measurement, the prior b transits into the state e1 with the probability p1 = (e1, b)
2 =
cos2(ϕ/2) and into the state e2 with the (complementary) probability sin
2(ϕ/2).
Under an impact of the second (naive) measurement (T,E−T ) the state e1 transits into
t with probability (e1, t)
2 = cos2(ϕ/2) whereas the state e2 transits into t with probability
(e2, t)
2 = sin2(ϕ/2). As the result, with this sequence of two measurements, the prior b
transits into the target t with probability cos4(ϕ/2) + sin4(ϕ/2).
Since cos2(ϕ/2) = 1/2 + cos(ϕ)/2 and sin2(ϕ/2) = 1/2 − cos(ϕ)/2, we can rewrite
cos4(ϕ/2) + sin4(ϕ/2) as 1/2 + cos2(ϕ)/2. Obviously, this number is no less than 1/2.
Summing up we have the following proposition
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Proposition 4. When both the prior and the target are pure states known to Sender
we can transform the prior b into the target t with the probability (1 + cos2(ϕ))/2 =
(1 + (b, t)2)/2, where ϕ is the angle between the vectors b and t.
One can easily see that a n−dimensional targeting problem essentially boils down
to the two dimensional case when both the prior and the target are pure states known
to Sender. Indeed, the vectors b and t lie in a two-dimensional subspace of H , and we
can consider that they have the form t = (1, 0, 0, ..., 0) and b = (cos(ϕ), sin(ϕ), 0, ..., 0).12
As the first measurement M we take the direct measurement with orthonormal basis
(e1, e2, ...en), where e1 = (cos(ϕ/2), sin(ϕ/2), 0..., 0), e2 = (sin(ϕ/2),− cos(ϕ/2), 0, .., 0),
e3 = (0, 0, 1, 0, ..., 0), e4 = (0, 0, 0, 1, 0, ..., 0) and so on. Further, the reasoning is the same
as above.
3.3 Illustration: Persuading a MP to vote No
We now return to the story about the MP’s decision to support or not a law that introduces
a state of emergency to combat terrorism (see Introduction). We below show how the
theory developed above can be used to analyze the activist’s successful persuasion of the
MP.
Let H be a two-dimensional Hilbert space with an orthonormal basis e1, e2; the cor-
responding projectors are P1 =

1 0
0 0

 and P2 =

0 0
0 1

. The MP (Receiver) has to
choose between two actions: Y es and No. We represent the action No with Hermitian
operator N =

1 0
0 −2

. The utility of this action in the state P1 is equal to 1, and is
equal to -2 in the state P2. The action Y es is given by Hermitian operator Y =

−1 0
0 1

.
If our MP has belief given by B =

a b
b 1− a

, then her expected utility of action No
is Tr(NB) = 3a − 2 whereas the expected utility of action Y es is Tr(Y B) = 1 − 2a. If
a < 3/5 our MP votes Y es; if a ≥ 3/5 the MP votes for No.
12The angle ϕ is a measure of the distance between the prior and the target state.
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We assume further that our MP holds initial belief (prior) B =

1/5 2/5
2/5 4/5

. With
this belief MP votes Y es.
The activist (Sender) receives utility 1 when succeeding in rallying an MP to the NO
vote whatever the true level of threat and utility 0 otherwise. With MP’s prior belief,
the activist gets the utility 0. Can he persuade Receiver to vote NO by selecting an
appropriate information structure? We would like to illustrate our results in Theorem 2
and Proposition 4 with this example as well as some issues pertaining to the choice of the
target state.
1) To begin with, suppose that the activist naively asks MP whether she believes the
threat is moderate (that is e1) or severe (that is e2). In the other words, he makes the
direct measurement (e1, e2). Already this simple and naive question changes the belief
of our MP: with probability p1 = Tr(BP1) = 4/5 her posterior becomes P1, and with
probability 1/5 her posterior becomes P2. So even this simple question increases the
(expected) utility of the activist up to 1/5.
Next we show that with two measurements Sender can do much better.
2) Let us consider another perspective on the law which we call ‘the quality of pub-
lic decision-making’ (cf. EU decision in the Introduction). A state of emergency gives
extended new powers to public officials. This quality property is ”tested” by the fol-
lowing direct measurement (Q1, Q2) with two possible outcomes Q1 =

1/2 1/2
1/2 1/2

 and
Q2 =

 1/2 −1/2
−1/2 1/2

. Such a measurement corresponds to a basis of the state space (of
the mental representation of the issue) different from the basis (e1, e2), a 45
◦ rotation of
(e1, e2). This means that (P1, P2) and (Q1, Q2) are two non-commuting measurements.
Or equivalently (P1, P2) and (Q1, Q2) correspond to properties of the system that are
incompatible in the mind of Receiver. She can think in terms of either one of the two
perspectives but she cannot synthesize (combine in a stable way) pieces of information
from the two perspectives.
Assume now that Sender brings up a discussion about the quality perspective and
performs measurement (Q1, Q2) that is Receiver learns whether or not the EU regulates
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cucumbers. With some probability p the belief B transits into Q1 (and with the comple-
mentary probability into Q2). Thereafter, the activist again asks her whether she believes
the threat is moderate or severe, i.e. performs measurement (P1, P2). If the posterior B
′
is equal to Q1 then with probability Tr (Q1P1) = 1/2 the new cognitive state becomes
the target P1. Similarly if the posterior is B
′′ = Q2 with probability Tr (Q2P1) = 1/2 it
transits into the target P1. In the state of belief P1 our MP votes NO. So with a prob-
ability 1/2 the target is reached and Sender gets an expected utility of 1/2 (instead of 0
without a persuasion or 1/5 in the case of a direct question).
3) Above we considered the case when the target was taken to be P1. But we can
take as a target another state T =

 3/5
√
6/5
√
6/5 2/5

. This target (as a belief state of
our MP) also induces action NO. As asserted in Proposition 4, Sender can transit into
this target state with probability 1/2 + (b, t)2/2. In our case b = (1/
√
5, 2/
√
5) and
t = (
√
3/
√
5,
√
2/
√
5), so that (b, t) =
√
3/5 +
√
8/5, this probability is equal to 0.916!
4) But a little (quantum) marvel awaits us ahead. We shall show that with the help
of one (blind) measurement Sender persuade MP to vote No with certainty.
For this purpose, Sender selects the blind measurement (Q1, Q2), whereQ1 =


1+c
2
c
c 1−c
2


and c = 1/
√
5. Correspondingly, Q2 =


1−c
2
−c
−c 1+c
2

. The probabilities are p1 = (1+ c)/2
and p2 = (1 − c)/2. The posterior is mixed state Bex = p1Q1 + p2Q2 =

 3/5 1/10
1/10 2/5


and MP chooses to vote No with probability 1!
In our example, we assume that the danger perspective (threat level) which appeals
to geopolitical arguments and emotional ones (fear) and the perspective on the quality of
decision-making in public administrations which appeals to arguments about bureaucratic
senselessness and the intrusiveness of the state, are two incompatible perspectives in the
MP’s mind. She can think in either perspective but find it difficult to deal with them
simultaneously although they are both relevant to the issue at stake.
The example illustrates how Sender can exploit the quantum indeterminacy of the
cognitive state (expressed in the incompatibility of the two perspectives) to persuade
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our (quantum-like) decision-maker. By performing a measurement on an incompatible
perspective, the cognitive state is modified such that beliefs with respect to the severeness
of the threat are updated so that Receiver prefers to vote NO with probability 1.
4 Concluding remarks
The theory of Bayesian persuasion establishes that it is often possible to influence a ra-
tional decision-maker by selecting a suitable information structure and making the corre-
sponding measurement. However, in the classical uncertainty environment the persuasion
power is strongly limited by Bayesian plausibility. The reality of persuasion or manip-
ulation seems however far more extended. Therefore, we have here extended it to the
non-classical (quantum) uncertainty environment. This corresponds to investigating per-
suasion with a quantum cognitive approach - an avenue of research that has experienced
rapid growth under the latest 20 years. In a recent paper [7], we establish that provided
Sender can make as many measurement as he wishes, full persuasion is always feasible.
Sender can bring Receiver to believe whatever he wants. This theoretical result suggests
that quantum persuasion is powerful indeed compared with Bayesian persuasion. But no
one expects Receiver to accept attempts to persuasion under an indefinite time. This
paper investigates what can be achieved with short sequences of measurements.
While Bayesian plausibility imposes a constraint, it also allows to simplify the per-
suasion problem so as to allow characterizing an optimal persuasion policy. In the non-
classical context, no such simplification is available and the issue of optimality cannot be
directly addressed. A simpler task that we call targeting is investigated and its results
can be viewed as a lower bound for what can be achieved in a full persuasion problem.
Our results show that even with a short sequence of two measurements, targeting is quite
powerful. In particular when the prior is known (and is a pure state), whatever the initial
belief, any target belief can be reached at least half of the time. Most interesting is to
understand how this is made possible. The first step amounts to creating what we would
like to call confusion (formally uniform uncertainty). This is possible precisely because
any quantum belief state (even pure) can always be “broken” by using a non-commuting
measurement. In quantum cognition this expresses the fact that people have difficulties to
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process different kinds of information into a single and stable representation of the world.
Our analysis suggests that this very feature makes a person easily influenceable. And
that a person can be persuaded more effectively using well-designed distraction rather
than by arguments of informational value to the decision. Distraction occurs when the
mind is turned toward a perspective that Receiver finds hard to combine with her current
perspective. It is a common experience that sellers use this tactic intuitively sensing that
it is quite efficient. We have here provided an argument based on purely informational
considerations that justifies a distraction policy in influence seeking activities.
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